American Success In Iraq, Civil War, And Paternalism

In the current climate of anti-Americanism and opposition to the Iraq War several lines of thought have proliferated regarding the dire circumstances of America’s policy. They are the unlikelihood of American success, the problem that the conflict in Iraq might be a civil war, and the unwarranted paternalism of American foreign policy. These viewpoints betray a misunderstanding of America’s role in the world.

Firstly, it must be said that there always was a chance for success in Iraq and there still is. According to journalist Michael Gordon and military analyst Bernard Trainor, in their book “Cobra II “, the operation for the liberation and reconstruction was planned but imperfectly executed. And what many critics of the war fail to realize is that Islamic extremism has its own agenda regardless of the maneuvers of the Bush administration or the perfectibility of operational plans. So even if strategy is competently executed Radical Islam will not go quietly in the night.

The Bush administration’s strategy of engagement with Islamic Extremism is an existential to threat to their ideology. The threat of the Coalition’s success is so dangerous to the Jihadis that if it wasn’t, then Al Qaeda and others would not have declared it the central front in their war against the West, nor would they and the insurgents have stepped up terrorist attacks in the last year. The establishment of a viable democracy in Iraq represents a mortal threat to the Jihadist worldview in such a way that it must be met with all possible resistance.

Actually, one could say that the war was slowly being won before March 2006. The bombing of the “Golden Mosque” at that time signaled a downward turn of events in Iraq. Before that terrorist attack several milestones and opinion polls in Iraq showed movement on a more positive trajectory, economically, politically, and societally. Since the Samara bombing, however, there has been a reversal.

But, this reversal is itself being reversed or at least contested. The recent successes of the “surge”, the political awakening of the Sunnis, the coming together of Sunnis and Shiites in Baghdad to oppose the Coalition wall to separate neighborhoods are instances of cooperation and reconciliation.

Moreover, the chance for success in Iraq is put into historical context by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s position paper about insurgent warfare. This study shows that insurgencies fail half the time and thus, counter-insurgencies succeed the other half of the time. A 50/50 ratio is a pretty good chance of success, especially in war.

So historically, data shows a legitimate chance for success; contemporaneously, developments show a halting realignment; and journalistically, reportage reveals the inherent problems of nation-building.

Secondly, the label of civil war has been applied to Iraq with the idea that if it is, then it is a losing proposition to continue to stay in such a benighted land. Even Democratic politicians like Senator Schumer have categorically asserted that Iraq is in a civil war and that America hasn’t even chosen sides. But to say that Iraq is a civil war is to imperfectly understand the meaning of that term.

The conventional view is that a civil war is a war in which parties within the same culture, society or nationality fight against each other for the control of political power. A more sophisticated view entails a broader and more accurate understanding.

John Keegan, an eminent British military historian, says Iraq is not a civil war because the criteria for civil war include, not only the conventional view, but that the opposing sides are recognized and are public in their views, that a significant portion of the population is associated with the opposing sides, and that there is hostile contention by means of armed forces. (This does not necessarily mean formal battles, but there must be a minimum degree of organisation, formality and identifiability of combatants). A civil war also requires leaders who say what they are fighting for, a public that understands what it is all about, and a sense of unity among the opposition. Most of these criteria are not met. Additionally, the point of the violence must be to achieve sovereign rule, control over a separatist state, or to force a major change in policy. Fighting for revenge, for rights, mass criminality and economic gain are not sufficient motives to proclaim civil war.

In contrast, a sectarian insurgency (which is what the Iraq war has become) is violent action by a minority group or groups within a state (or in some instances a majority group which lacks power) intent on forcing political change by a mixture of subversion, propaganda, military pressure, and ethnic or religious strife.

Furthermore, Senator Schumer’s allegation of civil war doesn’t hold up when the question is put to the very people who are supposed to be in the civil war – the Iraqi people. In a poll conducted in Iraq from Feb. 25 to Mar. 5, 2007, and published in the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index, the question was asked: Is Iraq in a Civil War? The overall response was 58% said no.

So the label of civil war does not hold in light of the criteria for the term, or even in the opinion of those Iraqis who are experiencing the war itself.

Thirdly, America’s role in Iraq has been impugned as paternalistic, that the US knows best what the Iraqi people want, and will force them to accept it.

But this is simplistic and misconstrues America’s role in the world. The idea that the America espouses democracy is not paternalism, but evidenced by the planet-wide movement towards democracy. One has only to look at the expansion of democracy around the world in the last 50 years. According to the UN, in the 1960’s there were about 30 democracies in the world, now there are about 120. That growth didn’t come about by paternalism. That growth came from a consensus by peoples around the world to embrace a system of government that encourages individualism and empowerment. America has been at the forefront of such a movement both directly and indirectly through the exercise of “hard and soft power”.

Moreover, the Iraqi people in three elections in 2005 voted in overwhelming numbers, under threat of death. This was not from some top-down directive, but a demonstration of a grassroots desire for choice and self-determination.

So Iraqis have voted freely without directives, don’t think it is a civil war they are in, and are following a trend in world history that embraces democracy; hardly the victims of paternalism.

The assessment that the policies of the America are misguided and even detrimental in individual cases can be argued; but in a wider context, over a period of decades, even centuries, the comparison with other countries and political systems would yield more beneficial results than detrimental ones. Hasn’t recent world history already shown a preference for liberal democracy over totalitarian communism? This is not to say that liberal democracy is the apotheosis of human government, but at this time in history it provides the best framework for the realization of basic human aspirations. This is the project outlined for America in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002.

America is not paternalistic, but quietly, perhaps annoyingly, confident that democracy will prevail.

Lawrence S. Harris
© June 2007